members of POSC: Energy and Minerals, Victoria Fitzroy, Victoria, AUSTRALIA; Beijing Research Institute of Petroleum, Beijing, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; and Matra Datavision, Les Ulis Cedex, FRANCE.

No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned activity of POSC.

On January 14, 1991, POSC filed its original notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on February 7, 1991, (56 FR 5021).

The last notification was filed with the Department on July 17, 1995. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on November 28, 1995 (60 FR 58643).

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 95–30848 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment Standards Administration

Correction

AGENCY: Employment Standards Administration, Labor.

SUMMARY: In notice document 95–29334 beginning on page 61712 in the issue of Friday, December 1, 1995, make the following correction.

On page 61713, right hand column, the OMB clearance number for forms WH–2, WH–205, WH–226–MIS, and WH–226A–MIS is listed as 1215–0158. This should be changed to 1215–0005.

Dated: December 14, 1995.

Margaret J. Sherrill,

Chief, Branch of Management, Review and Analysis, Division of Financial Management, Office of Management, Administration and Planning Employment Standards Administration.

[FR Doc. 95–30946 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–27–M

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION

Community Development Revolving Loan Program for Credit Unions

AGENCY: National Credit Union Administration.

ACTION: Notice of application period.

SUMMARY: The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) will accept applications for participation in the Community Development Revolving Loan Program for Credit Unions throughout calendar year 1996, subject to availability of funds. Application procedures for qualified low-income credit unions are set forth in Part 705, NCUA Rules and Regulations.

ADDRESSES: Applications for participation may be obtained from and should be submitted to: NCUA, Office of Community Development Credit Unions, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314–3428.

DATES: Applications may be submitted throughout calendar year 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The Office of Community Development Credit Unions at the above address or telephone (703) 518–6610.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Part 705 of the NCUA Rules and Regulations implements the Community Development Revolving Loan Program for Credit Unions. The purpose of the Program is to assist officially designated ''low-income'' credit unions in providing basic financial services to residents in their communities which result in increased income, ownership and employment. The Program makes available low interest loans and deposits in amounts up to $300,000 to qualified participating ''low-income'' credit unions. Program participation is limited to existing credit unions with an official ''low-income'' designation.

This notice is published pursuant to Part 705.9 of the NCUA Rules and Regulations which states that NCUA will provide notice in the Federal Register when funds in the program are available.

By the National Credit Union Administration Board on December 14, 1995.

Becky Baker,

Secretary, NCUA Board.

[FR Doc. 95–30937 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7535–01–U

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. Part 110]

In the Matter of Holders of Specific Licenses Authorizing Exports of Utilization Facilities and Source or Special Nuclear Materials to Euratom; Order Suspending Licenses

Effective January 1, 1996.

I

The licensees that are subject to this order hold specific licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to Sections 53, 54a, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA) and 10 CFR part 110. These specific licenses authorize exports to EURATOM of utilization facilities, special nuclear materials, and source materials for nuclear and uses under the terms of an Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and EURATOM.

II

The current U.S.-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation will expire on December 31, 1995. A new Agreement has been approved by authorities on both sides, but must sit before Congress for review for up to 90 days of continuous legislative session. Under Section 123 of the AEA, the NRC is prohibited from authorizing any exports to a foreign nation pursuant to Section 53, 54a, 57, 64, 82, 103 or 104 of the AEA in the absence of an Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the foreign nation.

III

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 123, 161b, 161i, 183, and 186 of the AEA, and 10 CFR 110.50(a)(1) and (2) and 110.52, from January 1, 1996 until such time that a new U.S.-EURATOM agreement comes into force,[1] NRC specific license authorization for nuclear exports to EURATOM under Sections 53, 54a, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104 of the AEA is suspended.[2] This suspension order expires by operation of law when a new Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and EURATOM comes into force and necessary assurances form EURATOM are received.

Dated: at Rockville, Maryland this 14th day of December, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Carlton R. Stoiber,

Director, Office of International Programs.

[FR Doc. 95–30889 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[1] The EURATOM Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Licensees holding free-standing licenses to Finland, Spain, or Sweden may continue direct exports to these countries because they had concluded bilateral Agreements with the U.S. before joining EURATOM. Such Agreements will remain valid until a new U.S.-EURATOM Agreement comes into force.

[2] In accordance with 10 CFR 110.52(c), the Commission finds that licensees need not be afforded an opportunity to reply and be heard since this action is required by operation of law and the common defense and security.

Biweekly Notice

Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

Pursuant to Public Law 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. Public Law 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from November 27, 1995, through December 8, 1995. The last biweekly notice was published on December 6, 1995 (60 FR 62485).

Notice Of Consideration Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, And Opportunity For A Hearing

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By January 19, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ''Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

Arizona Public Service Company, et al., Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50–529, and STN 50–530, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona

Date of amendments request: November 7, 1995

Description of amendments request: The proposed amendment would adopt the improved Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1432) format and content of Section 5.0, ''Design Features,'' as modified by approved changes to the improved Standard Technical Specifications.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The Proposed amendment does not change the Design Features, only relocates the information to other documents. This is consistent with the NRC Policy Statement and NUREG-1432. Therefore, relocating existing information, eliminating information which duplicates information found in other licensee documents, and making administrative improvements provide Technical Specifications which are easier to use. Because information is relocated to established programs where changes to those programs are controlled by regulatory requirements, there is no reduction in commitment and adequate control is still maintained. Likewise, the elimination of information which duplicates information in other licensee documents, enhances the useability of the Technical Specifications without reducing commitments. The administrative improvements being proposed neither add nor delete requirements, but merely clarify and improve the understanding and readability of the Technical Specifications. Since the requirements remain the same, these changes only affect the method of presentation and are considered administrative, and as such, would not affect possible initiating events for accidents previously evaluated or any system functional requirement.

Therefore, the proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The relocation of existing requirements, the elimination of requirements which duplicate existing information, and making administrative improvements are all changes that are administrative in nature. The proposed changes will not affect any plant system or structure, nor will they affect any system functional or operability requirements. Consequently, no new failure modes are introduced as a result of the proposed changes. The proposed changes are consistent with the improved Standard Technical Specifications, for the most part, as plant specific information is included in this section. Therefore, the proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes are administrative in nature in that no change[s] to the design features of the facility are being made. The Design Features Section is being reformatted to be consistent, for the most part, with NUREG-1432, ''Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants,'' Revision 1. The proposed changes do not affect the UFSAR design bases, accident assumptions, or Technical Specification Bases. In addition, the proposed changes do not affect release limits, monitoring equipment, or practices. Consequently, the proposed changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on that review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendments request involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Phoenix Public Library, 1221 N. Central Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Attorney for licensee: Nancy C. Loftin, Esq., Corporate Secretary and Counsel, Arizona Public Service Company, P.O. Box 53999, Mail Station 9068, Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999

NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50–213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: October 20, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Electrical Power Systems Surveillance Intervals from 18 months to once per refueling (i.e., nominal 24 months).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below. The no significant hazards consideration analysis has been divided into three parts: AC Sources Operating, DC Sources Operating, and On-Site Power distribution:

In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed changes and concluded that they do not involve an SHC. The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

AC Sources Operating

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will increase the interval between a surveillance that is performed during plant shutdown from once per 18 months to a maximum of once per 30 months (i.e., 24 months nominal + 25% as allowed by Specification 4.0.2). The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.f does not alter the intent or the method by which the surveillance is conducted. In addition, the acceptance criterion for the surveillance is unchanged. As such, the proposed change will not degrade the ability of the EDG [emergency diesel generator] to perform its intended function.

A review of the past surveillances, and preventive maintenance of the diesel generators indicates that the appropriate acceptance criterion was met in each case. Additional assurance of the diesel generator's operability is provided by Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and the performance of other on-line testing as described above. As such, the proposed changes do not adversely affect the probability of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change regarding the testing frequency of the diesel generators [i.e., from once per 18 months to a maximum of once per 30 months (i.e., 24 months + 25 percent as allowed by Specification 4.0.2)] does not affect the operation or response of any plant equipment, including the diesel generators, or introduce any new failure mechanism. The proposed change does not affect the test acceptance criteria of the EDGs. The plant equipment will respond per design and analyses, and there will not be a malfunction of a new or different type introduced by the testing frequency revision to the EDG surveillance requirements. As such, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The Bases Section of Technical Specification Section 3/4.8, ''Electrical Power Systems,'' states that the operability of the AC and DC power systems and associated distribution systems ensure that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown and mitigation and control of accident conditions. Bases Section 3/4.8 also states that the surveillance requirements for determining the operability of the EDGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1. The revision of surveillance requirements will continue to verify that the EDGs are operable. Operable EDGs ensure that the assumptions in the Bases of the Technical Specifications are not affected and ensure that the margin of safety is not reduced. Therefore, the assumptions in the Bases of the Technical Specifications are not affected and the change does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

DC Sources Operating

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

CYAPCO is proposing to modify the frequency of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, and f of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications from at least once per 18 months to at least once each refueling interval. These surveillance requirements verify the operability of components of the Class 1E DC power system. CYAPCO is also proposing to delete the term ''during shutdown'' contained in Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.d, 4.8.2.1.e, and 4.8.2.1.f.

Additional assurance of the operability of the Class 1E DC power system is provided by Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.a, b, and e.

The proposed changes do not alter the intent or method by which the surveillances are conducted, do not involve any physical changes to the plant, do not alter the way any structure, system, or component functions, and do not modify the manner in which the plant is operated. As such, the proposed changes in the frequency of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, and f will not degrade the ability of the Class 1E DC power system to perform its intended safety function. Also, the Class 1E DC power system is designed to perform its intended safety function even in the event of a single failure.

Equipment performance over the last four operating cycles was evaluated to determine the impact of extending the frequency of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d and f. cThis evaluation included a review of surveillance results, preventive maintenance associated with normal surveillance activities, and corrective maintenance records. It concluded that the Class 1E DC power system is highly reliable, and that there is no indication that the proposed extension could cause deterioration in the condition or performance of any of the subject Class 1E DC power system components.

The deletion of the phrase ''during shutdown'' in Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.d, e, and f is acceptable. The terms ''Cold Shutdown'' and ''Hot Shutdown'' are defined in the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications as operating modes or conditions. The proposed deletion of the term ''during shutdown'' is intended to prevent possible misinterpretations and is consistent with the recommendations of GL 91-04.

Based on the above, the proposed changes to Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, e, and f of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any accident previously evaluated.

CYAPCO is proposing to modify the frequency of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, and f of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications from at least once per 18 months to at least once each refueling interval. CYAPCO is also proposing to delete the term ''during shutdown'' contained in Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.d, 4.8.2.1.e, and 4.8.2.1.f. These surveillance requirements verify the operability of components of the Class 1E DC power system.

The proposed changes do not alter the intent or method by which the surveillances are conducted, do not involve any physical changes to the plant, do not alter the way any structure, system, or component functions, and do not modify the manner in which the plant is operated. As such, the proposed changes to Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, e, and f will not introduce a new failure mode.

Based on the above, the proposed changes to Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, e, and f of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

CYAPCO is proposing to modify the frequency of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, and f of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications from at least once per 18 months to at least once each refueling interval. CYAPCO is also proposing to delete the term ''during shutdown'' contained in Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.d, 4.8.2.1.e, and 4.8.2.1.f. These surveillance requirements verify the operability of components of the Class 1E DC power system.

Equipment performance over the last four operating cycles was evaluated to determine the impact of extending the frequency of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d and f. This evaluation included a review of surveillance results, preventive maintenance associated with normal surveillance activities, and corrective maintenance records. It concluded that the Class 1E DC power system is highly reliable, and that there is no indication that the proposed extension could cause deterioration in the condition or performance of any of the subject Class 1E DC power system components.

Additional assurance of the operability of the Class 1E DC power system is provided by Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.a, b, and e.

Since decreasing the surveillance frequency does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of a design basis accident previously analyzed, the proposed changes to Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.c, d, e, and f of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

On-Site Power Distribution

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.2 will increase the surveillance interval from once each refueling outage (once per 18 months) to a maximum of once per 30 months (i.e., 24 months nominal + 25% as allowed by Specification 4.0.2.). The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.2 does not alter the intent or the method by which the surveillance is conducted. In addition, the acceptance criterion for the surveillance is unchanged. As such, the proposed changes will not degrade the ability of the MCC-5 ABT scheme to perform its intended function.

The successful past surveillance results, and the simpler re-design of the MCC-5 ABT provide assurance of system operability up to a maximum of 30 months. As such, the proposed changes do not adversely affect the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not alter the intent or method by which the surveillance is conducted, does not involve any physical changes to the plant, does not alter the way any structure, system, or component functions, and does not modify the manner in which the plant is operated. As such, the proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.2 will not introduce a new failure mode.

Based on the above, the proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.3 of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.2 extends the frequency for verifying the operability of the MCC-5 ABT scheme from at least once per 18 months to at least once per refueling interval (i.e., 24 months nominal + 25% as allowed by Specification 4.0.2).

The proposed change does not alter the intent or method by which the surveillance is conducted, does not involve any physical changes to the plant, does not alter the way any structure, system, or component functions, and does not modify the manner in which the plant is operated. As such, the proposed change in the frequency of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.2 will not degrade the ability of the MCC-5 ABT to perform its safety function and does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, CT 06457.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: October 27, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will revise Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.6.3, ''Containment Isolation Valves.'' These changes will clarify the action statement for when a penetration has only one containment isolation valve (CIV) and that valve is inoperable.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

...The proposed change does not involve an SHC because the change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The containment isolation system is an engineered safety feature that functions to allow normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containment boundary, while preserving the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape of fission products that may result from postulated accidents.

All fluid system pipelines that penetrate the containment are provided with one or more valves that can be closed remotely, either electrically or pneumatically, or are locked manual valves. Most of the piping penetrations connect to equipment inside the reactor containment. Thus, they are not open to the reactor containment atmosphere and will not pass radioactive contamination to the CIV unless the pipe is ruptured inside containment during an accident.

Lines that penetrate the reactor containment and are not in service during operation are isolated with one or more locked closed CIVs. Lines that are in service and that pass fluids during operation are provided with one or more motor-operated valves, positive closure trip valves, or check-valves.

The lack of guidance contained in Technical Specification Section 3.6.3 for a penetration that has only one CIV in it, does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This design, and the consequences that could result from this configuration have been evaluated previously and found acceptable. The proposed modification simply provides guidance to the operators should a penetration with only one CIV becomes inoperable. This proposed technical specification will, as do other technical specification action statements, provide a reasonable time to correct the situation before a required shutdown must commence. In addition, this proposed Action Statement was developed to be consistent with Technical Specification Section 3.0.3.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed modification provides guidance to the operators should a penetration which has only one CIV be inoperable. This design has been previously evaluated and found to be acceptable from both a deterministic and probabilistic standpoint. The proposed modification will provide the operators specific guidance to restore the penetration to an operable state or to isolate it. With this guidance, they can avert the risk associated with a plant shutdown, which would be mandated without this guidance. Should a CIV be inoperable and not capable of being restored, the proposed technical specification provides additional options. However, a probabilistic risk assessment review has determined that these additional options are not risk significant. Finally, the containment isolation system cannot be an accident initiator, rather it is designed to respond to accidents. The inability of the CIVs to operate cannot create a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed modification provides the requirement to the operators should a penetration which has only one CIV be inoperable. The effects of this design have been previously evaluated and found to be acceptable from both a deterministic and probabilistic standpoint.

The current Haddam Neck Plant containment isolation system has been previously reviewed by the NRC. CYAPCO is not making any changes to the containment isolation system. CYAPCO is however, providing guidance in the technical specifications should a penetration which has only one CIV be inoperable. This guidance will allow CYAPCO to correct the event associated with the penetration with an NRC approved alternative, in a set time. This provision is safe especially when compared to the alternative which is a plant shutdown under Technical Specification Section 3.0.3.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, CT 06457.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee

Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: August 17, 1995

Description of amendment request: The Commission issued Amendment Nos. 128 and 122 to the Facility Operating Licenses for Catawba Units 1 and 2 on February 17, 1995, which revised Technical Specification (TS) Table 2.2-1 and TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.2.5 to allow a change in the method for measuring reactor coolant system (RCS) flowrate from the calorimetric heat balance method to a method based on a one-time calibration of the RCS cold leg elbow differential pressure taps. In its application submitted on January 10, 1994, for the above listed amendments, Duke Power (the licensee) neglected to modify SR 4.2.5.2 to delete that portion of the SR that specifies that the measurement instrumentation shall be calibrated within 7 days prior to the performance of the flowrate measurement. The licensee states that the requirement to calibrate the measurement instrumentation within 7 days prior to the performance of the flowrate measurement is impractical based on utilization of the cold leg elbow pressure tap method of RCS flowrate measurement. Accordingly, the licensee proposes to modify SR 4.2.5.2 to reflect the deletion of the subject requirement.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

The requested amendments will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This change is considered administrative in nature and should have been requested in Duke Power Company's January 10, 1994 application, as amended. The instrumentation which was subject to the requirement is no longer utilized in the fulfillment of the TS required RCS flowrate determination. The proposed changes will not result in any impact upon accident probabilities, since the RCS flowrate measurement instrumentation is not accident initiating equipment. Likewise, they will not result in any impact upon accident consequences, since no change to any method or frequency of calibration of the RCS flowrate transmitters will result. The plant response to accidents will not be affected.

Criterion 2

The requested amendments will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No change is being made to any plant design feature, or to the manner in which the plant will be operated. Therefore, no new accident causal mechanisms can be generated. As noted above, the proposed changes are considered administrative in nature, and should have been requested in the January 10, 1994 application, as amended.

Criterion 3

The requested amendments will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. No impact upon any fission product barriers will occur as a result of the approval of the proposed changes. No change to plant design, operating, maintenance, or test characteristics will result from the proposed amendments. No impact upon any plant safety margins will result.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: November 15, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments modify Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.1 and the associated Bases to increase the setpoint tolerance of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) from plus or minus one percent to plus or minus three percent, to incorporate a requirement to reset as-left MSSV lift settings to within plus or minus one percent following surveillance testing, and to delete two obsolete footnotes.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

The requested amendments will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. As demonstrated previously, all applicable licensing basis safety analyses were evaluated with a MSSV setpoint drift of plus or minus 3%. The results of the evaluations were within all appropriate accident analysis acceptance criteria. No significant impact on DNBR results, peak primary or secondary pressures, peak fuel cladding temperature, dose, or any other accident analysis acceptance criterion was involved. No impact on the probability of any accident occurring exists as a result of the increased MSSV setpoint tolerance.

Criterion 2

The requested amendments will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No change is being made to any plant design feature, or to the manner in which the plant will be operated. Therefore, no new accident causal mechanisms can be generated. The MSSV setpoint tolerance only affects the time at which the valve opens following or during a transient, and is not a contributor to the probability of an accident.

Criterion 3

The requested amendments will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As stated above, all relevant accident analyses were examined to determine the effect of the wider MSSV setpoint tolerances. All analysis results are within applicable acceptance criteria. Finally, the NRC has previously approved TS changes for other plants seeking to use the [plus or minus] 3 [percent] setpoint tolerance, including McGuire Nuclear Station (reference Amendment Nos. 146 and 128 for Units 1 and 2, respectively).

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: November 15, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments modify Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.5 to raise the minimum nuclear service water system's (RN) water level in the standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) from 570 to 571 feet mean sea level.

This change will increase the volume of water that will be available for use of the SNSWP as the ultimate heat sink for postulated accidents under all meteorological conditions.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

The requested amendments will not involve a significant increase in the probabililty or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendments will have no impact upon any accident probabilities, since the RN system is not a accident initiating system. It is an accident mitigating system. Accident consequences will not be affected, since the proposed amendments will require a greater surface area for heat transfer from the SNSWP water to the environment. It has been determined that with the required TS minimum water level of 571 feet and with the required TS temperature limit of 91.5F [degrees Farenheit], the SNSWP will be capable of fulfilling all design basis requirements pertaining to accident mitigation.

Criterion 2

The requested amendments will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. As stated previously, the RN system is not an accident initiator. No change is being made to the plant which would cause the RN system to become an accident initiator. All relevant procedures will be changed as required, commensurate with the NRC issuance of the requested amendments. No accident causal mechanisms will be affected. The effect of the increased SNSWP level on the SNSWP dam was evaluated and found to be negligible.

Criterion 3

The requested amendments will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As noted above, the SNSWP was evaluatd with the new TS level requirement and was determined to be operable and capable of meeting all design basis requirements. No impact on any fission product barriers is created by the proposed changes. The proposed changes will ensure that the RN system remains capable of fulfilling its required accident mitigating functions. SNSWP temperature will continue to be monitored at an elevation of 568 feet, which is considered to be the highest elevation at which the average SNSWP surface temperature is accurately represented and minimally influenced by daily temperature swings due to variations in solar heat input, air temperature, and rainfall temperature.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Date of amendment request: August 20, 1992, as supplemented December 5, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments, would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) related to the 60-month 120-volt battery surveillance requirement. The proposed change is to delete the words ''during shutdown'' from SR 4.8.2.1.2.e (performance discharge test). The licensee contends that the ''during shutdown'' provision in the TS is an impractical requirement because both units would have to be shutdown to perform the performance discharge test (PDT).

In the licensee's supplement dated December 5, 1995, proposed changes were made to TS 3/4 8.2 Bases to support the frequency of the PDT on the other batteries in the system after a battery that had its PDT performed is returned to service.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment seeks to change the surveillance requirements to allow the performance with the units on line. The surveillance can be safely completed as proposed without affecting unit operation. The equipment would not be removed from service for a time that would exceed the current allowed outage time. The probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated will not be increased because the removal of a battery from service can be performed while on line, and the loads of each battery can be assumed by another same-train battery which is the case for the battery being inoperable for any other reason. During the allowed outage time, even a single failure of any component (including Emergency Diesel Generator) will still leave a full capacity train available to provide instrumentation and control power for both units. Train redundancy is maintained at all times. Compensatory action is taken to prohibit discharge testing of the other remaining batteries within 10 days following a battery performance discharge test to ensure that the tested battery is fully recharged. Probabilistic Risk Analysis shows that the increase in Core Damage Frequency due to this operation is negligible.

2. The proposed amendment will not change any actual surveillance requirements, the change would simply allow the requirements to be met at different unit conditions. The performance of the surveillance with the units on line does not require any new component configurations that would reduce the ability of any equipment to mitigate an accident. The station would not be in any degraded status beyond that which has previously been evaluated. Therefore the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new accident.

3. The change would allow a battery to be removed from service for testing. However, the testing must be completed within the current allowed outage time. As the allowed outage time defines the required margin of safety for equipment operability, removing equipment from service for testing and returning it to service within the allowed time does not affect a margin of safety. Compensatory action is taken to prohibit discharge testing of the other remaining batteries within 10 days following a battery performance discharge test to ensure that the tested battery is fully recharged.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Atkins Library, University of North Carolina, Charlotte (UNCC Station), North Carolina 28223

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Duquesne Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Shippingport, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: November 6, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the alarm setpoints for the noble gas and in-containment high range area radiation monitors listed in Table 3.3-6 of Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1. The proposed revisions would make these alarm setpoints consistent with the criteria in the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) which were revised and

approved by the NRC in August 1994. The revised EALs use the noble gas radiation monitors as indications of effluent releases and are based on dose to the public. The revised EALs use the in-containment high range area radiation monitors as indication of fission product barrier challenges or failures rather than as indications of effluent release.

The proposed amendment would also revise Action Statement 36 of Table 3.3-6 of TS 3.3.3.1 for both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 to reflect a previously approved change in reporting frequency for effluent releases. BVPS-1 License Amendment No. 188 and BVPS-2 License Amendment No. 70 (both issued on June 12, 1995) approved a change in the reporting frequency for effluent releases from semi-annual to annual. The proposed change would make Action Statement 36 consistent with this previously approved change.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed monitor alarm setpoint changes and editorial changes are administrative in nature. Should the radiation alarm fail to annunciate or give a false alarm, there would be no affect on any other plant equipment or systems. The noble gas monitors are not safety related and do not interface with any safety related system. The containment area monitors are safety related; however, they do not initiate any safety function, nor do they interface with any other safety related system.

The monitors' alarm as a visual (lighted icon) and audible alarm in the control room. The operator is then responsible for taking any corrective actions necessary, based on the alarm and Emergency Action Level (EAL) guidelines. The monitors do not provide for any automatic actions of other equipment or systems when an alarm condition occurs.

The operating and design parameters of the radiation monitors will not change. The proposed change affects only the radiation level at which an alarm condition is created and does not affect any accident assumptions or radiological consequences of an accident.

Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed radiation monitor alarm revisions cannot initiate a new type of accident. A failure of the monitor itself cannot serve as the initiating event of an accident and has no effect on the operation of a safety system. Operator action is not made solely on a radiation monitor alarm; other plant condition indicators are also evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The referenced radiation monitoring channels have no capability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Also, they do not interface with any safety related system. The containment area monitors are safety related channels which provide indication to the operator of the integrity of the fission product barriers in containment. This indication, combined with other indications of plant conditions may direct an operator to take action to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The alarm setpoint itself does not perform any specific safety related function and the trip value is not referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), nor does any site design basis document take credit for this setpoint. Safety limits and limiting safety system settings are not affected by this proposed change. Also, the site will continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 which limits offsite dose following a postulated fission product release.

Therefore, use of the proposed technical specification would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of amendment request: November 22, 1995

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to change Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications (TS) Index to delete reference to the BASES. The proposed revisions to Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 TS are administrative in nature. Changes to the TS BASES will be controlled by a plant procedure under administrative controls and reviews. Proposed changes to the TS BASES will be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below.

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendments are administrative in nature and do not affect assumptions contained in plant safety analyses, the physical design and operation of the plant, nor do they affect Technical Specifications that preserve safety analysis assumptions. The Technical Specification BASES, per 10 CFR 50.36(a), are not a part of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the TS BASES will be controlled by a plant procedure under administrative controls and reviews. Proposed changes to the TS BASES will be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the proposed change does not affect the probability or consequences of accidents previously analyzed.

(2) The proposed license amendments do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendments are administrative in nature. The proposed amendments will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the proposed amendments will not change the physical plant or the modes of plant operation defined in the facility operating license. No new failure mode is introduced due to the administrative change, since the proposed change does not involve the addition or modification of equipment nor does it alter the design or operation of affected plant systems, structures, or components.

(3) The proposed license amendments do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The operating limits and functional capabilities of the affected systems, structures, and components are unchanged by the proposed amendments. The BASES information, per 10 CFR 50.36(a), is not a part of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the TS BASES will be controlled by a plant procedure under administrative controls and reviews. Proposed changes to the TS BASES will be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the proposed change does not reduce any margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Florida International

University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199

Attorney for licensee: J. R. Newman, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit No. 3, Citrus County, Florida

Date of amendment request: November 3, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the technical specifications (TS) to delay for one cycle the volumetric and surface examinations of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor flywheels required by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.14, Regulatory position C.4.b, incorporated by reference in Technical Specification 5.6.2.8.c, to coincide with Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Refueling Outage 11, scheduled for Spring 1998.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The safety function of the RCP flywheels is to provide a coastdown period during which the RCPs would continue to provide reactor coolant flow to the reactor after loss of power to the RCPs. The maximum loading on the RCP motor flywheel results from overspeed following a large LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. The estimated maximum obtainable speed in the event of a Reactor Coolant System piping break was established conservatively. The proposed one time change does not affect that analysis. Reduced coastdown times due to a single failed flywheel would not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition since a locked rotor (instantaneous coastdown) is analyzed in the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]. The proposed change does not increase the amount of radioactive material available for release or modify any systems used for mitigation of such releases during accident conditions. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction to any margin of safety.

FPC [Florida Power Corporation] has performed two full volumetric examinations in excess of those recommended in RG 1.14, Revision 1 during the Second ISI [inservice inspection] Interval. The margins of safety defined in RG 1.14, Revision 1 used in the analysis are not significantly changed.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Coastal Region Library, 8619 W. Crystal Street, Crystal River, Florida 32629

Attorney for licensee: A. H. Stephens, General Counsel, Florida Power Corporation, MAC - A5D, P. O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia

Date of amendment request: November 10, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for containment systems to reflect the adoption of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, and the implementation of a performance-based containment leak-rate testing program at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes do not involve any physical or operational changes to structures, systems or components. The proposed changes provide a mechanism within the TS for implementing a performance-based leakage rate test program which was promulgated by the revision to 10 CFR 50 to incorporate Option B to Appendix J. The TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) remain unaffected by these changes. Thus, the safety design basis for the accident mitigation functions of the primary containment, the airlocks, and the primary containment isolation valves is maintained. Therefore, these changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed. Revising Surveillance Requirement acceptance criteria and frequencies does not physically modify the plant and does not modify the operation of any existing equipment.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, nor do they affect a safety limit, an LCO, or the manner in which plant equipment is operated. The NRC letter dated November 2, 1995, recognizes that changes similar to the proposed changes are required to implement Option B of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. In NUREG-1493, ''Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program,'' which forms the basis for the Appendix J revision, the NRC concludes that adoption of performance-based test intervals for Appendix J testing will not significantly reduce the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Appling County Public Library, 301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

GPU Nuclear Corporation, Docket No. 50-320, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 (TMI-2), Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: January 16, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise TMI-2 Operating License No. DPR-73 by modifying Section 6.5.1.7 of the administrative controls portion of the technical specifications. The revision would change Section 6.5.1.7 to delete the requirement for personnel in the internal GPU Nuclear (GPUN) Review and Approval matrix to render an unreviewed safety question (USQ) determination regarding (1) proposed changes to unit technical specifications and (2) investigations of violations of technical specifications. Both of these activities involve docketed correspondence with the NRC in which the USQ determination is made and justified. This obviates the need for a requirement for the licensee to perform and document an internal USQ

determination. This change would make the TMI-2 Technical Specifications consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications for B&W Plants (NUREG 1430).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

10 CFR 50.92 provides the criteria which the Commission uses to perform a no significant hazards consideration. 10 CFR 50.92 states that an amendment to a facility license involves no significant hazards if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change to the technical specifications is administrative and does not involve any physical changes to the facility. No changes are made to operating limits or parameters, nor to any surveillance activities. Based on this, GPU Nuclear has concluded that the proposed change does not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence of the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendment is purely administrative and affects only the review of activities that involve considerable review by the NRC. This change will not degrade the performance of review for either of the two activities that are affected. This proposed technical specification change does not involve changes to hardware configuration, operation, or testing. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident since the change is administrative and no new failure modes are created.

3. Involve a change in the margin of safety. This change is administrative in nature; compatible with standard technical specifications; and does not affect any safety settings, equipment, or operational parameters.

Based on the above analysis it is concluded that the proposed changes involve no significant safety hazards considerations as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis of the licensee and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Walnut Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: Seymour H. Weiss

Illinois Power Company and Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc., Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: October 27, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3, ''Control Rod OPERABILITY,'' to include the 25% surveillance overrun allowed by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.2 into the allowances of the surveillance Notes for control rod ''notch'' testing per Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3. The proposal also includes a clarification to the description of TS Table 3.3.3.1-1, ''Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation,'' Function 7, to indicate that the Function's requirements apply to the position indication for only automatic primary containment isolation valves, rather than all primary containment isolation valves. Finally, the proposal includes changes to correct a number of editorial and typographical errors inadvertently contained in TS 3.3.4.1, ''End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation,'' TS 3.3.6.1, ''Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation,'' TS 3.3.8.2, ''Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring,'' and TS 3.6.5.2, ''Drywell Air Lock.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

(1) The proposed changes associated with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.3 are being made to make the surveillance requirement (SR) Notes agree with their original intent. The Notes were originally intended to allow the testing of control rods to be tracked as a group, i.e., partially withdrawn and fully withdrawn. In the event that a control rod(s) has changed from one test group to another, the Notes were intended to allow performance of the next surveillance on that control rod(s) to be delayed to coincide with the next regularly scheduled performance of the test of the new group. However, these Notes failed to include the 25% surveillance extension allowances of SR 3.0.2. This proposed change merely adds the 25% extension to the time allowed by the Notes to make them agree with the Frequency plus the extension allowance of SR 3.0.2. The addition of the word ''fully'' to the Note for SR 3.1.3.2 is to provide for clarification only. These changes are consistent with changes approved for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) and River Bend Station and are being proposed for the Clinton Power Station (CPS) for consistency. The proposed changes do not involve a change to the control rods or control rod drive system design or operation. Further, the proposed change does not affect the way in which the associated control rod test is performed, only the ''triggers'' for performance of the test are affected. These triggers are being revised to make them consistent with their original intent. As a result, the proposed change cannot increase the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to the description of LCO 3.3.3.1 Function 7 to include ''automatic'' is provided for clarification only. As described in the Bases for this Function, the requirements for operability are currently only associated with automatic primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). As a result, this change does not involve a change to the scope of this LCO. In addition, these changes are consistent with changes approved for GGNS and are being proposed for CPS for consistency. Since this request does not affect the design or operation of this equipment, nor does it alter the scope of this Technical Specification (TS) requirement, this proposed change cannot increase the probability or the consequences or any accident previously evaluated.

The remaining proposed changes are purely editorial and do not affect the design or operation of any equipment or alter the technical requirements of any TS. As a result, these proposed changes cannot increase the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

(2) The proposed changes do not affect the design or operation of any equipment. In addition, the proposed changes do not affect the manner in which any test is performed or involve a change to any plant operating mode or configuration. As a result, Illinois Power has concluded that the proposed changes cannot create the possibility of an accident not previously evaluated.

(3) The proposed changes to the SRs for LCO 3.1.3 are being made to make the SR Notes agree with their original intent and thus permit control rods to be tested as originally intended. The proposed changes do not involve a change to the control rods or control rod drive system design or operation. Further, the proposed change does not affect the way in which this test is performed or the routine Frequency of performing the test, only the ''triggers'' are affected. Since these triggers are being revised to make them consistent with their original intent, Illinois Power has determined that this change does not result in a reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed change to the description of LCO 3.3.3.1 Function 7 to include ''automatic'' is provided for clarification only. As described in the Bases for this Function, the requirements for operability are

currently only associated with automatic PCIVs. As a result, this change does not involve a change to the current scope of this LCO. Since this request does not affect the design or operation of this equipment, nor does it alter the scope of this TS requirement, this proposed change does not result in a reduction in the margin of safety.

The remaining changes are purely editorial and do not affect the design or operation of any equipment or alter the technical requirements of any TS. As a result, these proposed changes do not result in a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Vespasian Warner Public Library, 120 West Johnson Street, Clinton, Illinois 61727

Attorney for licensee: Sheldon Zabel, Esq., Schiff, Hardin and Waite, 7200 Sears Tower, 233 Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606

NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Illinois Power Company and Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc., Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: October 27, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification 5.2.2.e, ''Unit Staff,'' to revise the requirements for controls on the working hours of unit staff who perform safety related functions. The proposal would clarify the approval requirements for deviations from the overtime guidelines and eliminate the requirement for a monthly review of individual overtime, consistent with GL 82-12, ''Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours,'' dated June 15, 1982.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

(1) The proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant design or operation. The proposed changes do not affect the level of approval required for deviations from the overtime guidelines. As the Technical Specifications will continue to require deviations from the guidelines for overtime control to be approved and documented, the proposed changes do not adversely affect the level of alertness for the unit staff who perform safety-related functions. The current requirement for the plant manager (or his designee) to perform a monthly review of individual overtime is an after the fact review that has not been proven to provide any significant benefit with respect to the control of individual overtime. In addition, the proposed changes do not directly affect the automatic operation of equipment or systems assumed to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents. As a result, the proposed changes do not affect any of the parameters or conditions that contribute to initiation of an accident previously evaluated, and thus, the proposed changes cannot increase the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

(2) The proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant design or operation. The proposed changes do not affect the level of approval required for deviations from the overtime guidelines and do not adversely affect the level of alertness for the unit staff who perform safety-related functions. As a result, the proposed changes do not affect any of the parameters or conditions that could contribute to initiation of an accident, and thus cannot create the possibility of an accident not previously evaluated.

(3) The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As noted previously, the proposed changes do not change the level of approval required for deviations from the overtime guidelines. Only the requirement for an after-the-fact monthly review is proposed to be deleted. To the extent that personnel alertness may be regarded as a margin of safety, deleting this requirement will not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety since overtime controls consistent with the guidelines and requirements of GL 82-12 will continue to remain in place.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Vespasian Warner Public Library, 120 West Johnson Street, Clinton, Illinois 61727

Attorney for licensee: Sheldon Zabel, Esq., Schiff, Hardin and Waite, 7200 Sears Tower, 233 Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606

NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

Date of amendment requests: May 19, 1995, as supplemented October 20, 1995 (AEP:NRC:1213A)

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would modify the Technical Specification (TS) action statement associated with the main steam safety valves (MSSVs). The action statement would reflect different requirements based on operating mode and the power range neutron flux high setpoint with inoperable MSSVs would be revised in response to an issue raised in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter 94-001. The supplement also requested the addition of an exemption to TS 4.0.4 in the surveillance requirements for the MSSVs.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

Correction of the setpoint methodology does not represent a credible accident initiator. The new methodology reduces the allowable power level setpoints and is conservative compared to the presently evaluated setpoints. The consequences of any previously evaluated accident are not adversely affected by this action because the decrease in the setpoints resulting from the new calculational methodology will ensure that the MSSVs are capable of relieving the pressure at the allowable power levels. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Correcting the overly restrictive action statements of T/S 3.7.1 does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident. The proposed changes modify existing text to more accurately reflect the intention of the restrictions imposed by the action statements. The changes do not create any situation that would initiate a credible accident sequence.

The proposed 4.0.4 exemption is necessary to make the T/Ss accurately reflect limitations associated with conduct of the surveillance in Mode 3. Additionally, the change is needed to address the fact that unscheduled outages can and do occur and, when they do, surveillances can expire with no way to correct the situation until the unit returns to power. Since the purpose of the 4.0.4 exemption is to allow surveillances to be conducted after an extended period of reactor shutdown, the decay heat to be removed by the MSSVs will be less than (and therefore conservative compared to) the conditions experienced when the surveillances are already allowed by the T/Ss. These allowed conditions include conduct of the surveillance during power operation or immediately after shutdown. Therefore, we believe that any increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously analyzed would be insignificant.

Criterion 2

The change in Table 3.7-1 reduces the allowable power levels that can be achieved in the event that one or more main steam safety valve(s) is inoperable. This change is a result of vendor guidance to correct an error in the existing methodology used to determine the setpoints for the power level.

Changing the methodology used to determine the setpoints, and lowering the setpoints themselves, do not create a new condition that could lead to a credible accident. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The action statements remain in effect to perform the intended function of protecting the plant's secondary side when the main steam safety valves are inoperable. They have only been modified to correct the overly restrictive language that specifies when, in each mode, specific actions must be taken. Therefore, the proposed change does not create a new or different type of accident.

Because the proposed 4.0.4 exemption requires neither physical changes to the plant nor changes to the safety analyses, we believe that they will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3

The margin of safety presently provided is not reduced by the proposed change in the setpoints. The change will correct the limiting power levels that are to be implemented when MSSVs are inoperable. This action does not adversely affect the margin that was previously allocated for the ability of the MSSVs to relieve secondary side pressure. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety is also not significantly reduced by the proposed change to the action statements of the T/S. The proposed revision clarifies when specific actions are to be taken in response to inoperable main steam safety valves. The changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the actions to be taken; therefore, they do not significantly reduce any margin of safety.

The margin of safety is not adversely affected by the proposed exemption to T/S 4.0.4, since the surveillance conditions allowed by the exemption are bounded by the normal surveillance conditions seen immediately after shutdown or during power operation.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. The initial application was noticed in the Federal Register on June 21, 1995 (60 FR 32368).

Local Public Document Room location: Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: Brian E. Holian, Acting

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

Date of amendment requests: November 10, 1995 (AEP:NRC:0896X) (Supersedes application dated June 15, 1995.)

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would change the 18-month emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance test from a 24-hour run to an 8-hour run and would add voltage and frequency measurement and power factor monitoring.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

The safety function of the EDGs is to supply AC electrical power to plant safety systems whenever the preferred AC power supply is unavailable. Through surveillance requirements, the ability of the EDGs to meet their load and timing requirements is tested and the quality of the fuel and the availability of the fuel supply are monitored. Reduction of the 24 hour run to 8 hours will not reduce the surveillance effectiveness and will sufficiently exercise the EDG and its support systems to identify potential conditions that could lead to performance degradation (See Attachment 4 [of amendment request]). Further, monthly full-load testing will provide confidence in diesel reliability and performance capability. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2

The proposed changes do not involve physical changes to the plant or changes in plant operating configuration. The changes only involve EDG surveillance test requirements. These changes will not affect EDG operability and are designed to improve surveillance effectiveness. Also, paralleling the diesel to the system grid during normal operations has been performed to fulfill monthly surveillance requirements when the resistive load banks were not available.

It is recognized that, during the 1 hour monthly surveillance test period, the diesel could be exposed to electrical system transients (e.g., transients induced by inclement weather conditions) which could cause the paralleled diesel output breaker to trip open. Such a scenario, although unlikely, is mitigated by the availability of the alternate EDG which is placed in the auto start mode prior to the surveillance. In addition, during testing, an operator is continuously monitoring the diesel control panel and can, if necessary, reset the affected EDG lockout relays to restore EDG availability. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3

Although the duration of the EDG 18 month 24 hour surveillance test would be reduced, the EDG components will continue to be sufficiently exercised such that the ability to detect incipient and degraded conditions will be maintained (See Attachment 4, Figure 2 [of amendment request]). Also, the added review of diesel reactive loading ensures that test conditions closely match potential emergency conditions. In addition, the monthly full-load testing will provide confidence in diesel reliability and performance capability without impacting diesel operability. During the monthly test, the impact on plant safety due to potential exposure to transient grid conditions is considered to be insignificant based on the likelihood of such transients coincident with the testing and the mitigating factors discussed in Criterion 2 above.

Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. This notice supersedes the staff's notice published in the Federal Register on July 19, 1995 (60 FR 37096).

Local Public Document Room location: Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: Brian E. Holian, Acting

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: October 25, 1995

Description of amendment request: The amendment request would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to relocate the flow-biased average power range monitor (APRM) scram and rod block setpoint requirements for reactor operation with excessive core peaking, which will also include surveillance requirements to verify the setpoints. The amendment would also delete TS Figure 2.1.2, and any references to the figure. APRM meter setting adjustments would be changed to allow setpoint adjustment to be made at power levels less than or equal to 90% of the rated, and the

requirement that the scram setting adjustment be <10% would be further defined as <10% of the rated thermal power. The amendment would incorporate several editorial changes and renumbered pages, the removal of blank pages, a revised Table of Contents, and a modified Bases section for the APRM setpoint requirements.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The proposed changes do not cause the APRM scram and rod block setpoints or APRM meter readings to be manipulated differently. The change limiting the scram and rod block setting adjustments to less than 10% of rated thermal power is more conservative than the current specification in that it allows the APRM meter indication to be set closer to the flow-biased scram or rod block setpoint. There are no other changes to the basic function of any plant equipment. The proposed changes to technical specifications will not decrease the margin to the fuel thermal-mechanical design limits, so the potential for any fuel failure from the LHGR [linear heat generation rate] transient overpower condition is not increased. Therefore, the consequences of a transient overpower are also not increased. Based on the above, these changes will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

Moving the APRM setpoint adjustment from Section 2 to Section 3/4.11 does not reduce or eliminate any requirements. The requirements for the APRM setpoint adjustment are more clearly defined in the LCO [limiting conditions for operation] and Surveillance Requirements with specific applicability and corrective action requirements. The proposed changes do not affect the basic function of any plant equipment. The basic process for performing the APRM setpoint adjustment is not significantly changed, so the proposed changes do not create a new process and do not involve any new failure that would cause a new or different kind of accident to occur.

The elimination of redundant information in the technical specifications and the relocation of information pertinent to the operators for performing the APRM setdown determination does not create a new or different kind of accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Allowing APRM setpoint adjustment during power operation at off-rated conditions improves the flexibility to make control rod pattern or core flow adjustments, but will still preserve the required setdown factor that must be maintained in that flux shape and power level. The change to set up the APRM meter reading up to 10% above the nominal power indication (instead of setting up only to the current MFLPD [maximum fraction of limiting power density] percentage) allows a higher APRM meter setting to be made. This allows the conservative setting, but eliminates frequent setting changes each time a new value of FRP/MFLPD [fraction of rated power] is calculated provided the APRM setting remains conservatively greater than or equal to MFLPD/FRP multiplied by percent core thermal power. Thus, the margins to the fuel thermal and mechanical design limits are not reduced. The fuel remains adequately protected from failure due to a transient LHGR overpower condition. There is no reduction in any margin of safety.

The time requirements imposed are consistent with the current fuel thermal limit LCO actions and are more conservative than STS, therefore, the proposed action time requirement provides the same margin of safety as currently exists in the MP1 [Millstone Unit 1] Technical Specifications. The margins to the fuel thermal and mechanical design limits are not reduced. There is no reduction in any margin of safety and the fuel remains adequately protected from failure due to a transient LHGR overpower condition.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: November 20, 1995

Description of amendment request: The first of the proposed changes provides clarification to the applicability statement for the steam generator blowdown monitor in Table 3.3-12. The applicability is changed to be for Modes 1-4 only. The second proposed change involves the action statement for the steam generator blowdown monitor in Table 3.3-12, Action 2. The action required when the monitor is not operable is clarified to state that if discharges are suspended, no sampling is required. The last proposed change involves the applicability statement for the condensate polishing facility waste neutralizing sump radiation monitor. It is clarified to state that the monitor is only required when the pathway is in use.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

... NNECO [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] concludes that these changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration since the proposed changes satisfy the criteria in 10CFR50.92(c). That is, the proposed changes do not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes clarify the modes and conditions for which the radiation monitors are utilized, as well as the required actions when the monitors are not operable. These changes are administrative in nature, therefore, the changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes have no [e]ffect on the ability of the monitors to perform their design function. The clarifications do not involve any physical modifications to any equipment, structures, or components. The proposed changes have no impact on design basis accidents, and the changes will not modify plant response or create a new or unanalyzed event.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

These changes do not have any impact on the protective boundaries and, therefore, have no impact on the safety limits for these boundaries. The instrumentation associated with these changes do not provide a safety function and only serve to provide radiological information to plant operators. The instrumentation has no [e]ffect on the operation of any safety-related equipment. No hardware, software, or setpoint changes are involved in this proposed change. These changes provide clarification of modes and conditions for which the radiation monitors are utilized. As such, these changes have no impact on the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: November 21, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would clarify the reactor containment building temperature as ''an equilibrium liner temperature,'' and the affected Bases will be updated to reflect the results of the most recent main steam line break (MSLB) analysis. The changes to the Bases also identify that the limiting event affecting containment temperature and pressure now includes the MSLB in addition to a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

... NNECO [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] concludes that these changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration since the proposed change satisfies the criteria in 10CFR50.92(c). That is, the proposed changes do not:

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

These changes are clarifications that are administrative in nature. The changes only incorporate the revised containment analysis as approved by the NRC. There are no hardware changes and no change to the functioning of any equipment which could affect any operational modes or accident precursors. Therefore, there is no way that the probability of previously evaluated accidents could be affected.

There are no hardware modifications associated with these changes and no change to the functioning of any equipment which could affect radiological releases. The safety analysis of the plant is unaffected by the changes. Therefore, there is no effect on the consequences of previously evaluated accidents.

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

These changes are clarifications that are administrative only. There are no hardware changes and no change to the functioning of any equipment which could introduce new or unique operational modes or accident precursors. Therefore, there is no possibility of an accident of a new or different type than previously evaluated.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

These changes are clarifications that are administrative in nature. They do not increase or decrease any plant operating requirements or limits. Therefore, they have no effect on any safety analysis and no impact on the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: November 14, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would remove the Technical Specification (TS) for motor operated valves with thermal overload protection and bypass devices (TS 3/4.8.4.2) to follow the guidance of the improved Westinghouse Standardized TS (NUREG-1431, Rev. 1).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report] is not significantly increased.

The removal of TS 3/4.8.4.2 from TS in no way impacts the accident analysis of the FSAR. Compliance of 10 CFR 50, as applies to Regulatory Guide 1.106, will be maintained and controlled through plant procedures with changes evaluated through 10 CFR 50.59 rather than through TS amendments. Therefore, the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident has not been increased.

2. The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated is not created.

The proposed TSCR [TS change request] does not necessitate physical alteration of the plant nor changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident or malfunction.

3. The margin of safety has not been significantly reduced.

The removal of TS 3/4.8.4.2 and Table 3.8-2 will not diminish the existing thermal overload protection and/or bypass devices operability and testing requirements. They will be maintained and controlled in plant procedures, and changes will be subject to 10 CFR 50.59 review. Therefore, the margin of safety has not decreased.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Fairfield County Library, 300 Washington Street, Winnsboro, SC 29180

Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, Post Office Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Frederick J. Hebdon

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: November 21, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.5.2 by allowing a one time extension of the allowable outage time from 72 hours to 7 days for each residual heat removal (RHR) train. The one time extension is needed to allow maintenance and modification to the RHR system while the plant is in Mode 1.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.

The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report] does not change. A one time extension to increase the allowed outage time for each train of RHR from 72 hours to 7 days affects only RHR train availability which does not contribute to the probability of a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. The proposed change to TS 3/4.5.2 has been shown to have only a small increase in Core Damage Frequency. The consequences of a

LOCA does not change from those currently resulting from a LOCA initiated while in TS 3.5.2 ACTION statement (a.), thus, there is no change in consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.

2. The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated is not created.

The proposed TSCR [TS change request] only results in a one time increase in the allowable outage time for each train of RHR. It does not result in an operational condition different from that which has already been considered by TS. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident or malfunction.

3. The margin of safety has not been significantly reduced.

The effects of increasing the allowed outage time on the calculated core damage frequency has been evaluated and determined to be small.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Fairfield County Library, 300 Washington Street, Winnsboro, SC 29180

Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, Post Office Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Frederick J. Hebdon

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Centerior Service Company, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, Toledo Edison Company, Docket No. 50-440, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1, Lake County, Ohio

Date of amendment request: November 22, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would change the operating license to reflect the license transfer for part of Ohio Edison Company's ownership interest in the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), Unit No. 1 to its wholly owned subsidiary, OES Nuclear Inc.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the PNPP Operating License are administrative and have no effect on the PNPP facility, programs, personnel or any plant systems. All Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety Systems Settings, and Safety Limits specified in the Technical Specifications will remain unchanged. This change meets one of the examples of a change not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration in that it is a purely administrative change. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,864 (1983).

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the PNPP Operating License are administrative and have no effect on the PNPP facility, programs, personnel or any plant systems. PNPP's design and design bases will remain unchanged as will All Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety Systems Settings, and Safety Limits specified in the Technical Specifications. This change meets one of the examples of a change not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration in that it is a purely administrative change. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,864 (1983).

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed changes to the PNPP Operating License are administrative and have no effect on the PNPP facility, programs, personnel or any plant systems. All Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety Systems Settings, and Safety Limits specified in the Technical Specifications will remain unchanged. This change meets one of the examples of a change not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration in that it is a purely an administrative change. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,864 (1983).

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Perry Public Library, 3753 Main Street, Perry, Ohio 44081

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia

Date of amendment request: November 20, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for the North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2 (NA-1&2). Specifically, the change would permit the use of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, Performance-Based Containment Leakage Rate Testing.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has amended its regulations to provide a performance-based option for leakage-rate testing of containments. This testing option is available in lieu of compliance with the prescriptive requirements contained in Appendix J regulations. In order to implement the performance-based leakage-rate testing option the TS must be changed to eliminate reference to the prescriptive Appendix J requirements. Therefore, the licensee is proposing a change to the NA-1&2 TS to eliminate the current prescriptive requirements for leakage rate testing of the containment and reference Option B to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.163, ''Performance-Based Containment Leakage-Test Program.'' This change will permit use of the performance-based surveillance testing, Option B, of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Specifically, operation of North Anna Power Station with the proposed change will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in either the probability of occurrence or consequences of any accident or equipment malfunction scenario which is important to safety and which has been previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Plant systems and components will not be operated in a different manner as a result of the proposed Technical Specifications change. The proposed change permits a performance-based approach to determining the leakage-rate test frequency for the containment and containment penetrations (Type A, B, and C tests). Since the proposed change only affects the test frequency for containment and containment penetrations, the probability of occurrence of an accident is not affected by the proposed changes in the leak-rate test interval.

The proposed change increases the probability of a malfunction due to the longer intervals between leakage tests. It has been estimated that the longer test intervals will increase the overall accident risk to the public by approximately 0.7% and 2.2% (for changes in the frequency of Type A tests and Type B and C tests, respectively). However, this increase in accident risk has been judged to be insignificant. This increase has been reviewed and judged to be acceptable by the NRC as documented in NUREG-1493 and the recent rulemaking to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

The Limiting Conditions for Operation are not being changed for the containment or any other safety system. The containment and other safety system remain operable as

assumed in the accident analysis. Since the proposed change does not affect the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the containment, the containment penetrations, or the other safety systems, the consequences of an accident are not affected by the changes in test frequency.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different type of accident than those previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Implementing the proposed Technical Specifications change to remove the prescriptive testing requirements and permit use of Appendix J, Option B, performance-based testing of containment and its penetrations do not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than was previously evaluated in the UFSAR. Plant systems and components will not be operated in a different manner as a result of the proposed Technical Specifications change. Thus, the proposed Technical Specifications change in leakage-rate test frequency does not introduce any new accident precursors or modes of operation. The containment and containment penetrations will not be operated any differently as a result of the proposed change.

Therefore, the possibility for an accident of a different type than was previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report is not created by the proposed Technical Specifications change.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change, which replace[s] the present prescriptive testing requirements with Appendix J, Option B, performance-based testing of containment and its penetrations, will continue to ensure that the existing accident analysis assumptions are maintained. The containment and containment penetrations will not be operated or tested any differently. Only the leakage rate test frequency is being changed as a result of the proposed change. The operational leakage-rate test acceptance criteria and the operability requirements are not being changed.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: The Alderman Library, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-2498.

Attorney for licensee: Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Hunton and Williams, Riverfront Plaza, East Tower, 951 E. Byrd Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia

Date of amendment request: November 20, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to the Surry Technical Specifications would eliminate the existing prescriptive testing requirements for leakage rate testing of the containment and instead reference the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.163,'' Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program,'' which would permit use of the performance-based leakage rate testing, Option B of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Specifically, operation of Surry Power Station with the proposed change will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in either the probability of occurrence or consequences of any accident or equipment malfunction scenario which is important to safety and which has been previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Plant systems and components will not be operated in a different manner as a result of the proposed Technical Specifications change. The proposed change permits a performance-based approach to determining the leakage-rate test frequency for the containment and containment penetrations (Type A, B, and C tests). There are no plant modifications, or changes in methods of operation. Therefore, the changes in testing intervals for the containment and containment penetrations have no [e]ffect on the probability of occurrence of a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. Since the proposed change only affects the test frequency for containment and the containment penetrations, and the as-found test acceptance criteria at Surry the probability of occurrence and the consequences of an accident are not affected by the proposed changes in the leak-rate test interval.

The proposed change increases the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety due to the longer intervals between leakage tests. It has been estimated that the longer test intervals will increase the overall accident risk to the public by approximately 0.7% and 2.2% (for changes in the frequency of Type A tests and Type B and C tests, respectively). However, this increase in accident risk has been judged to be insignificant. This increase has been reviewed and judged to be acceptable by the NRC as documented in NUREG-1493 and the recent rulemaking to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

The containment and other safety system remain operable as assumed in the accident analysis. Changing the as-found acceptance criterion to 1.0 La at Surry does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident, since the accident analysis assume[s] a leakage rate of La for Design Basis Accidents. The as-left Type A test acceptance criterion remains at less than [or equal to] 0.75 La. Since the proposed changes do not affect the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the containment, the containment penetrations, or the other safety systems, the consequences of an accident are not affected by the changes in test frequency.

Therefore, the probability of an accident or consequences of an accident are not adversely affected as a result of this change.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different type of accident than those previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Implementing the proposed Technical Specifications change to remove the prescriptive testing requirements and permit use of Appendix J, Option B, performance-based testing of containment and its penetrations does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than was previously evaluated in the UFSAR. Plant systems and components will not be operated in a different manner as a result of the proposed Technical Specifications changes. Thus, the proposed Technical Specifications changes in leakage-rate test frequency do not introduce any new accident precursors or modes of operations. The containment and containment penetrations will not be operated any differently as a result of the proposed changes. Therefore, the possibility for an accident of a different type than was previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report is not created by the proposed Technical Specifications change.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed Technical Specifications change, which replace[s] the present prescriptive testing requirements with Appendix J, Option B, performance-based testing of containment and its penetrations, will continue to ensure that the existing accident analysis assumptions are maintained. The containment and containment penetrations will not be operated or tested any differently. The leakage rate test frequency is being changed as a result of the proposed change. Changing the as-found acceptance criterion to 1.0 La at Surry does not increase the consequences of an accident, since the accident analysis assume[s] a leakage rate of La for Design Basis Accidents. The as-left Type A test acceptance criterion remains at less than [or equal to] 0.75 La, which maintains the operating margin. The operational leakage-rate test acceptance criteria and the operability requirements are not being changed. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications bases is unaffected.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185.

Attorney for licensee: Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Hunton and Williams, Riverfront Plaza, East Tower, 951 E. Byrd Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin

Date of amendment request: October 23, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would change the name of the licensee from Wisconsin Electric Power Company to Wisconsin Energy Company.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. Operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendments will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

As a result of the proposed license amendment, there will be no physical change to the facilities and all Limiting Conditions for Operations, Limiting Safety System Settings, and Safety Limits specified in the Technical Specifications will remain unchanged. Also, the facilities' Quality Assurance Program, Emergency Plan, Security Plan, and Operator Training and Requalification Program will be unaffected. Therefore, this amendment will not cause a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendments will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment will have no effect on the physical configuration of the facilities or the manner in which they will operate. The design and design basis of the plants will remain the same. The current plant safety analysis will therefore remain complete and accurate in addressing the design basis events and in analyzing plant response and consequences for the facilities. The Limiting Conditions for Operations, Limiting Safety System Settings, and Safety Limits specified in the Technical Specifications for the facilities are not affected by the proposed license amendment. The plant conditions for which the design basis accident analysis have been performed will remain valid. Therefore, the proposed license amendment cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendments will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Plant safety margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety System Settings, and Safety Limits specified in the Technical Specifications. Since there will be no change to the physical design or operation of the plant, there will be no change to any of these margins. Thus, the proposed license amendment will not involve a reduction in any margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Joseph P. Mann Library, 1516 Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54241.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin

Date of amendment request: November 17, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 15.6.3, ''Facility Staff Qualifications.'' The position of Health Physics Manager would be renamed Health Physicist. This change would provide additional staffing flexibility.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. Operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendments does not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes separate the qualifications requirements of the Technical Specifications from the Health Physics Manager, while requiring that the same qualifications be fulfilled by a designated Health Physicist position within the organization. This change maintains the present knowledge requirements of the PBNP staff. The personnel holding the health physics qualifications are not considered in the probability of any accident. By ensuring the appropriate expertise remains on the staff to advise management on issues related to radiological safety, appropriate action is assured during analyzed events to assess and mitigate the radiological consequences. Therefore, this change does not affect the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendments will not result in a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change separates the Health Physics Manager qualifications from the position while maintaining the requirements for that expertise to be maintained within the organization. This is an administrative change only and does not affect any plant structures, systems and components. Therefore, a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated cannot result.

3. Operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendments will not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes are administrative only. The required levels of expertise and experience will be maintained within the Health Physics organization. Therefore, there is no reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Joseph P. Mann Library, 1516 Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54241.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Gail H. MarcusWolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas

Date of amendment request: November 22, 1995

Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise Technical Specification 3.9.4, ''Containment Building Penetrations,'' and its associated Bases section to allow the containment personnel airlock doors to be open during core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel in containment provided that a minimum of one door in the emergency airlock is closed and one door in the personnel airlock is capable of being closed. Also, Surveillance Requirement 4.9.4 would be revised to specify that each containment penetration should be in its ''required condition,'' instead of ''closed/isolated condition.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to Technical Specification 3.9.4 would allow the containment personnel airlock to be open during fuel movement and core alterations. The containment personnel airlock is currently closed during fuel movement and core alterations to prevent the escape of radioactive material in the event of a fuel handling accident. The containment personnel airlock is not an initiator of any accident. Whether the containment personnel airlock doors are open or closed during fuel movement and core alterations has no affect on the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does alter assumptions previously made in evaluating the radiological consequences of the fuel handling accident inside the containment building. The proposed change allows for the containment personnel airlock to be open during refueling. The radiological consequences described in this change are bounded by those given in the Wolf Creek Generating Station Safety Evaluation Report and General Design Criteria 19. All doses for the proposed change are less than the acceptance criteria, therefore, there is no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The proposed change would significantly reduce the dose to workers in the containment in the event of a fuel handling accident by accelerating the containment evacuation process. The proposed change would also significantly decrease the wear on the containment personnel airlock doors and, consequently, increase the reliability of the containment personnel airlock doors in the event of an accident.

Since the probability of a fuel handling accident is unaffected by the airlock door positions, and the increased doses do not exceed acceptance limits, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not affect the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change affects a previously evaluated accident, e.g., a fuel handling accident inside containment. The existing accident has been modified to account for the containment personnel airlock doors being opened at the time of the accident. It does not represent a significant change in the configuration or operation of the plant. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety is reduced when the offsite and control room doses exceed the acceptance criteria in the Wolf Creek Generating Station Safety Evaluation Report. As previously discussed in the response to Standard I, the offsite and control room doses are below the acceptance criteria. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room locations: Emporia State University, William Allen White Library, 1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 66801 and Washburn University School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Previously Published Notices Of Consideration Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, And Opportunity For A Hearing

The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices either because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration.

For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice.

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois;Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: November 14, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would close out additional open items identified in the NRC staff's review of the upgrade of the Dresden and Quad Cities Technical Specifications (TS) to the standard Technical Specifications (STS) contained in NUREG-0123. The Technical Specification Upgrade Program (TSUP) is not a complete adaption of the STS. The TS upgrade focuses on (1) integrating additional information such as equipment operability requirements during shutdown conditions, (2) clarifying requirements such as limiting conditions for operation and action statements utilizing STS terminology, (3) deleting superseded requirements and modifications to the TS based on the licensee's responses to Generic Letter (GL), and (4) relocating specific items to more appropriate TS locations. The November 14, 1995, application proposed to close out all open items identified during the NRC's review as noted in previous NRC staff Safety Evaluations for previously provided submittals regarding the TSUP project.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: November 29,1995 (60 FR 61272).

Expiration date of individual notice: December 28, 1995

Local Public Document Room location: for Dresden, the Morris Area Public Library District, 604 Liberty Street, Morris, Illinois; and for Quad Cities Station, the Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois.

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois;Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, Illinois; Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: November 14, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would change the technical specifications of these plants to incorporate 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, ''Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing For Water-Cooled Power Reactors'', Option B.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: December 7, 1995 (60 FR 62896)

Expiration date of individual notice: January 8, 1996

Local Public Document Room location: for Dresden Station, Morris Area Public Library District, 604 Liberty Street, Morris, Illinois; for LaSalle County Station, Jacobs Memorial Library, Illinois Valley Community

College, Oglesby, Illinois; and for Quad Cities Station, Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois.

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: November 14, 1995

Description of amendment request: The notice relates to your November 14, 1995, application to amend the Technical Specifications to provide a one-time exception to the Technical Specification 3.9.12, ''Fuel Building Storage Air Cleanup System,'' to allow the fuel storage building air cleanup system to be inoperable during intervals in which new fuel rack modules will be moved into and old fuel modules will be moved out of the fuel storage building.

Date of pulbication of individual notice in Federal Register: November 28, 1995 (60 FR 58688)

Expiration date of individual notice: December 28, 1995

Local Public Document Room location: Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, CT 06457.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee

Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: January 12, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated June 29, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would modify portions of Technical Specification Section 6.0, ''Administrative Controls.''

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: November 24, 1995, (60 FR 58109)

Expiration date of individual notice: December 26, 1995

Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: September 5, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: November 28, 1995 (60 FR 58690)

Expiration date of individual notice: December 28, 1995

Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Oswego County, New York

Date of amendments request: October 25, 1995

Description of amendments request: The proposed amendments would change position titles and reassign responsibilites at the upper management level to reflect a restructuring of Niagara Mohawk's upper management organization.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: November 16, 1995 (60 FR 57605)

Expiration date of individual notice: December 18, 1995

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: October 3, 1995

Description of amendment request: The notice relates to your October 3, 1995, application to amend the Technical Specifications to remove the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements for the loss-of-normal power (LNP) trip function from Tables 3.2.2 and 4.2.1 and insert new LCO 3.2.F and Surveillance Requirement 4.2.F. In addition, the proposed amendment will add a new table to specify the required LNP instrumentation for each bus, will update the Table of Contents, will make some editorial changes, and will revise the associated Bases section.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: December 4, 1995 (60 FR 62111).

Expiration date of individual notice: January 3, 1996

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Notice Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for the particular facilities involved.

Arizona Public Service Company, et al., Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona

Date of application for amendments: July 3, 1995

Brief description of amendments: The amendment temporarily adds new Action Statements 3.8.1.1.f and 3.8.1.1.g to Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, ''A.C. Sources - Operating,'' to provide a method of responding to sustained degraded voltage. Also, Bases 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3 (≥A.C. Sources,'' ''D.C. Sources,'' and ''Onsite Distribution

Systems,'' respectively) are being revised to provide guidance on how and why degraded offsite power voltage and the number of startup transformers in service affect compliance to GDC 17 and to give the basis for the additional action statements.

Date of issuance: November 28, 1995

Effective date: November 28, 1995

Amendment Nos.: Unit 1 - Amendment No. 102; Unit 2 - Amendment No. 90; Unit 3 - Amendment No. 73

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 2, 1995 (60 FR 39431) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 28, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Phoenix Public Library, 12 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of application for amendments: August 30, 1994, as supplemented August 4, 1995.

Brief description of amendments: This application upgrades the current custom Technical Specifications (TS) for Dresden and Quad Cities to the Standard Technical Specifications contained in NUREG-0123, ''Standard Technical Specification General Electric Plants BWR/4.'' This application upgrades only Section 3/4.2, ''Instrumentation.''Date of issuance: November 20, 1995

Effective date: Immediately, to be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

Amendment Nos.: 142, 136, 164, and 160

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19, DPR-25, DPR-29 and DPR-30. The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 30, 1995 (60 FR 45177) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 20, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: for Dresden, Morris Area Public Library District, 604 Liberty Street, Morris, Illinois 60450; for Quad Cities, Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois 61021.

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, IllinoisDocket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of application for amendments: September 17, 1993, as supplemented July 20, 1995.

Brief description of amendments: This application upgrades the current custom Technical Specifications (TS) for Dresden and Quad Cities to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) contained in NUREG-0123, ''Standard Technical Specification General Electric Plants BWR/4.'' This application upgrades only Section 3/4.7, ''Containment Systems.''

Date of issuance: November 27, 1995

Effective date: Immediately, to be implemented no later than June 30, 1996, for Dresden Station and June 30, 1996, for Quad Cities Station.

Amendment Nos.: 143, 137, 165, 161

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19, DPR-25, DPR-29 and DPR-30: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 2, 1995 (60 FR 39433) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 27, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: for Dresden, Morris Area Public Library District, 604 Liberty Street, Morris, Illinois 60450; for Quad Cities, Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois 61021.

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina

Date of application of amendments: January 12, 1995, as supplemented by letter

dated June 29, 1995

Brief description of amendments: The amendments would revise and clarify portions of Technical Specification Section 6.0, ''Administrative Controls.''

Date of Issuance: December 1, 1995

Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days

Amendment Nos.: 211, 211, and 208

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 15, 1995 (60 FR 14020) The June 29, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the January 12, 1995, application and the initial proposed no signficant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 1, 1995No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina

Date of application of amendments: September 1, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated November 15, 1995

Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise Technical Specification (TS) 6.9.2 to include references to updated or recently approved mathodologies used to calculate cycle-specific limits contained in the Core Operating Limits Report. The subject references have previously been reviewed and approved by the NRC staff.

Date of Issuance: December 4, 1995

Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days

Amendment Nos.: 212, 212, 209

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 11, 1995 (60 FR 52928) The November 15, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the September 1, 1995, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 4, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of application for amendments: July 26, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated October 4, 1995

Brief description of amendments: These amendments concern revising certain surveillance intervals and allowable outage times for the RPS and ESFAS equipment.

Date of issuance: November 29, 1995

Effective date: November 29, 1995Amendment Nos. 179 and 173Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41: Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 25, 1995 (60 FR 54720) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 29, 1995 No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendment: May 24, 1995, as supplemented July 24, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to extend the test interval for the source range neutron flux instrumentation from 7 days prior to startup to 6 months prior to startup.

Date of Issuance: November 24, 1995

Effective date: As of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment No.: 199

Facility Operating License No. DPR-50. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 21, 1995 (60 FR 32365) The July 24, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 24, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Law/Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, (REGIONAL DEPOSITORY) Walnut Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg, PA 17105.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: June 14, 1993, supplemented April 12, 1994

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the technical specifications (TSs) to include wording consistent with 10 CFR Part 20, and to deleted TSs governing miscellaneous radioactive material sealed sources.

Date of issuance: November 28, 1995

Effective date: November 28, 1995

Amendment No.: 174

Facility Operating License No. DPR-46. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 1, 1993 (58 FR 46237) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 28, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Auburn Public Library, 118 15th Street, Auburn, NE 68305.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: July 24, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated October 30, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The amendment revises the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TS) relating to reactor coolant system leakage. Specifically, the amendment deletes Table 3.4-1, ''Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves'' from the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 TS section 3.4.6.2. Also, reference to Table 3.4-1 is deleted from Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.6.2 f and from Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.2. The information contained in Table 3.4-1 is to be relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual. Additionally, a footnote providing certain exceptions from the requirements of SR 4.4.6.2.2d for the RHR Pump A and RHR Pump B Suction Isolation Valves previously located on Table 3.4-1 is relocated as a footnote to SR 4.4.6.2.2d.

Date of issuance: November 28, 1995

Effective date: As of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 44

Facility Operating License No. NPF-86. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 30, 1995 (60 FR 45180). The licensee's letter dated October 30, 1995, provided a minor revision to the application that was within the scope of the original notice and did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The October 30, 1995, letter also contained a request for an additional change that will be addressed separately.The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 28, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Exeter Public Library, Founders Park, Exeter, NH 03833.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: September 20, 1995

Description of amendment request: The amendment modifies the Appendix A Technical Specifications for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation. Specifically, the amendment revises the Seabrook Station Technical Specifications to relocate Functional Unit 6.b, ''Feedwater Isolation - Low RCS T_{avg} Coincident with a Reactor Trip'' from Technical Specification 3.3.2. ''Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation'' to the Technical Requirements Manual which is a licensee controlled document.

Date of issuance: November 29, 1995

Effective date: As of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 45

Facility Operating License No. NPF-86. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 24, 1995 (60 FR 54524). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 29, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Exeter Public Library, Founders Park, Exeter, NH 03833.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: June 7, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The amendment increases the temperature limit, as specified by the

footnotes to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.7 and to Table 3.4-2, above which reactor coolant sampling and analysis for dissolved oxygen is required and dissolved oxygen limits apply.

Date of issuance: November 29, 1995

Effective date: November 29, 1995

Amendment No.: 46

Facility Operating License No. NPF-86. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 19, 1995 (60 FR 37098). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 29, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Exeter Public Library, Founders Park, Exeter, NH 03833.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-423, MillstoneNuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

Date of application for amendment: June 8, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment modifies Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.5.1.c and deletes Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.8.4.3, ''AC Circuits Inside Containment.'' The changes to SR 4.5.1.c clarify the requirements for securing the safety injection accumulator isolation valve breakers (3SIL*MV8808A, B, C, and D) in the tripped position for the applicable modes. The amendment also deletes TS 3/4.8.4.3 since reasonable assurance is provided to protect the electrical penetrations and penetration conductors against an overcurrent condition and single failure of a circuit breaker.

Date of issuance: November 29, 1995

Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 121

Facility Operating License No. NPF-49. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 2, 1995 (60 FR 39444) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 29, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Docket No. 50-353, Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendment: June 23, 1995

Brief description of amendment: This amendment involves a one-time change affecting the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) for the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, the Suppression Pool Cooling, the Suppression Pool Spray, and Low Pressure Coolant Injection modes of the Residual Heat Removal System, and Core Spray System to be extended from 3 and 7 days to 14 days during the Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled to begin in January 1996. This proposed extended AOT allows adequate time to install isolation valves and cross-ties on the ESW and RHRSW Systems to facilitate future inspections or maintenance.

Date of issuance: November 30, 1995

Effective date: November 30, 1995

Amendment No. 70

Facility Operating License No. NPF-85. This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 2, 1995 (60 FR 39448) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 30, 1995No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Pottstown Public Library, 500 High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 50-286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York

Date of application for amendment: March 3, 1995, as supplemented April 12, 1995, and November 20, 1995.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the TS to extend the calibration frequency for the following:

(1) Containment water level monitor instrumentation (specified in TS Table 4.1-1)

(2) Containment building ambient temperature sensors (specified in TS Table 4.1-1)

(3) Seismic monitoring instrumentation (specified in TS Table 4.10-2)

In addition, the amendment added a new surveillance requirement to TS Table 4.1-1 for testing the core exit thermocouples.

These changes allow operation on a 24-month fuel cycle and follow the guidance provided in Generic letter 91-04, ''Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle,'' as applicable.

Date of issuance: December 1, 1995

Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment No.: 164

Facility Operating License No. DPR-64: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 10, 1995 (60 FR 24917) The April 12 and November 20, 1995, letters provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 1, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10610.

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendment: July 27, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment changes the Technical Specifications to incorporate updated pressure vs. temperature operating limit curves.

Date of issuance: November 28, 1995

Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days

Amendment No.: 88

Facility Operating License No. NPF-57: This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 13, 1995 (60 FR 47624) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 28, 1995. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Pennsville Public Library, 190 S. Broadway, Pennsville, New Jersey 08070

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendment: March 31, 1994, supplemented by letters dated August 29, and October 16, 1995.

Brief description of amendment: This amendment changes Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, ''ECCS -

Operating,'' and associated Bases, to establish a new allowed out-of-service time. Action c.2 for TS 3.5.1 allows any one Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem, or one Core Spray subsystem, to be inoperable in addition to an inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection system, for 72 hours.

Date of issuance: November 30, 1995

Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 89

Facility Operating License No. NPF-57: This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 8, 1994 (59 FR 29631).The supplemental letters did not change the NRC staff's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 30, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Pennsville Public Library, 190 S. Broadway, Pennsville, New Jersey 08070

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Centerior Service Company, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, Toledo Edison Company, Docket No. 50-440, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1, Lake County, Ohio

Date of application for amendment: March 24, June 9, and June 30, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Technical Specifications to allow a one-time extension for the performance of certain Surveillance Requirements (SRs). Affected SRs include penetration leak rate testing, valve operability testing, instrument calibration, response time testing, and logic system functional tests. The proposed changes are to support refueling outage 5 scheduled to begin no later than February 15, 1996.

Date of issuance: November 29, 1995

Effective date: November 29, 1995

Amendment No. 75

Facility Operating License No. NPF-58: This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 10, 1995 (60 FR 24919) and August 16, 1995 (60 FR 42612)The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 29, 1995. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*Perry Public Library, 3753 Main Street, Perry, Ohio 44081

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Centerior Service Company, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, Toledo Edison Company, Docket No. 50-440, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1, Lake County, Ohio

Date of application for amendment: October 21, 1994

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.2, ''Primary Containment Leakage,'' and its associated Bases to reflect the partial exemptions to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Sections III.A.5(b)(2), III.B.3, III.C.3, III.A.1(d), III.D.1(a), and III.D.3 that were granted by the NRC on December 4, 1995.

Date of issuance: December 8, 1995

Effective date:]December 8, 1995

Amendment No.: 76

Facility Operating License No. NPF-58: This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 16, 1995 (60 FR 42611) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 8, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Perry Public Library, 3753 Main Street, Perry, Ohio 44081

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of application for amendment: July 28, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment clarifies the limiting condition for operation for TS 3.8.1.1 and 3.8.1.2 from ''independent'' circuit to ''qualified'' circuit; explains in the Bases the requirements for operability of an offsite circuit; deletes the STAGGERED TEST BASIS scheduling requirement to perform emergency diesel generatorsurveillances; explains in the Bases an acceptable method for verification of Emergency Diesel Generator speed for surveillance requirements (SR) 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.c.4; removes a surveillance test extension that has expired for SR 4.8.1.1.1.b; adds an exception for SR 4.8.1.1.2.c.5 and 4.8.1.1.2.c.7 to SR 4.8.1.2; and revises Bases 3.0.5 to reflect the clarification from ''independent'' circuit to ''qualified'' circuit.

Date of issuance: December 8, 1995

Effective date: December 8, 1995

Amendment No.: 203

Facility Operating License No. NPF-3. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 8, 1995 (60 FR 56370) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 8, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*University of Toledo, William Carlson Library, Government Documents Collection, 2801 West Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of application for amendment: October 2, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Section 5.0, ''Design Features,'' by adding a site location description, removing site area maps, removing containment and reactor coolant system design parameters, removing the description of the meteorological tower location, removing component cyclic or transient limits, and revising the fuel assembly description to include the use of ZIRLO clad fuel rods.

Date of issuance: December 8, 1995

Effective date: December 8, 1995

Amendment No.: 204

Facility Operating License No. NPF-3. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 8, 1995 (60 FR 56371) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 8, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

*Local Public Document Room location:*University of Toledo, William Carlson Library, Government Documents Collection, 2801 West Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Callaway County, Missouri

Date of application for amendment: June 23, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical

Specification (TS) 4.1.3.1.2, 4.4.6.2.2.b, 4.4.3.2, 4.6.2.1.d, 4.6.4.2, and Table 4.3-3 in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 93-05, ''Line Item Technical Specification Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operations.'' Additionally, the amendment revises TS 4.1.1.1.1, 4.1.1.2, 3/4.1.3.1 and the associated Bases to implement portions of NUREG-1431, ''Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants.''

Date of issuance: December 7, 1995

Effective date: December 7, 1995

Amendment No.: 105

Facility Operating License No. NPF-30. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 30, 1995 (60 FR 45187). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 7, 1995.No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:*Callaway County Public Library, 710 Court Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of December 1995.For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects - I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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BILLING CODE 7590–01–F

Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 2; Issuance, Availability

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently published ''Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'' NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 2. For over 20 years the NRC has conducted regulatory value-impact analyses to determine whether there is an adequate basis for imposing new requirements on licensees. In January 1983, the NRC first published its Regulatory Analysis Guidelines (NUREG/BR–0058) in order to clarify and formalize its existing value-impact guidance for the analysis of regulatory actions. Revision 1 to NUREG/BR–0058 was issued in May 1984 to include appropriate references to NUREG/CR–3568; a handbook that provided implementation guidance to the NRC staff for the policy set forth in the Guidelines.

In August 1993, the NRC published a draft version of the Guidelines, Revision 2, and invited public comment on the draft report. This revision reflects (1) the NRC's accumulated experience with implementing the previous Guidelines; (2) changes in NRC regulations and procedures since 1984, especially the backfit rule (10 CFR 50.109) and the Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants (51 FR 30028, August 21, 1986); (3) advances and refinements in regulatory analysis techniques; (4) regulatory guidance for Federal agencies issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and (5) procedural changes designed to enhance NRC's regulatory effectiveness.

In the draft report, the NRC indicated that a review and analysis of the dollar per person-rem conversion factor policy was ongoing and until its completion, the existing conversion factor policy would remain operative. The conversion factor is a central consideration because it is the basis for translating radiological exposure to a monetary value and, as such, allows direct comparison between the potential health and safety benefits and the costs of a proposed regulatory initiative. The staff's reevaluation has now been completed, and the Commission has decided to implement a $2000 per person-rem conversion factor, subject it to present worth considerations, and limit its scope solely to health effects. This is in contrast to the previous policy and staff practice of using an undiscounted $1000 per person-rem conversion factor which served as a surrogate for all offsite consequences (health and offsite property).

The new conversion factor policy is based on a relatively simple and straightforward logic in which the dollar per person-rem conversion factor is defined as the product of the dollar value of the health detriment and a risk coefficient that establishes the probability of health effects as a result of low doses of radiation. In the NRC's formulation, the value of the latter term is on the order of 7×10^{-4} per rem which includes allowances for fatal cancers, nonfatal cancers, and severe genetic effects. The national and international bodies (NCRP, ICRP) directly responsible for evaluating and recommending a risk coefficient for the total health detriment are all in close agreement, and NRC has adopted their recommendations. For the dollar valuation of the health detriment, the NRC has adopted $3 million as a representative value. This estimate is consistent with OMB's best estimate and an extensive literature review performed by the NRC. The resulting $2000 conversion factor was derived by multiplying these two factors (7×10^{-4} and $3 million) and expressing the result with one significant digit.

In addition, to provide meaningful summations of the costs and benefits that accrue over time, the dollar valuation of person-rem are to be expressed on a present-worth basis. Based on OMB guidance, present-worth calculations are to use the recommended discount rate specified in the latest version of OMB Circular A–94. This circular was most recently updated in late 1992 and specifies the use of a 7-percent real discount rate.

The final change in conversion factor policy concerns the treatment of offsite property consequences. The $2000 conversion factor is now clearly defined as the value of the health effects associated with a person-rem of dose. As such, it can no longer be used as a surrogate value for other consequences that could be attributable to offsite radiological releases or exposures. Thus, in those regulatory applications where offsite property consequences could result, these consequences would have to be calculated separately, and incorporated into the overall value-impact assessment.

The net effect of this revised conversion factor policy on the bottom-line value-impact results is mixed. In most regulatory applications the only consequence of radiological exposure is health effects. As a result, the dollar valuation of a person-rem would shift from an undiscounted $1000 to a $2000 conversion factor which would be subject to present worth calculations. In these circumstances, the doubling of the conversion factor and discounting tend to cancel each other. The differential in total dollar valuation is not of major significance and no improvement or change in regulatory decisions is expected. However, there are select circumstances where improvements in regulatory decisionmaking are possible. In regulatory applications involving certain severe power reactor accidents, offsite property consequences are an expected outcome. Under the new policy, an additional dollar allowance would need to be included, and in these instances the change in total dollar value could be important to the regulatory decision.

The new conversion factor policy has been incorporated in this final version of the Guidelines without the opportunity for public comment. This position was adopted because the NRC was interested in avoiding further delay in publication of the Guidelines so that analysts will have the benefit of other areas of improved guidance. Furthermore, in most regulatory